THE 25TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE USE OF FORCE

Dean Rusk*
Did the United Nations General Assembly, in its 25th Anniversary
plenary session, make a significant contribution to international law
regarding the use of force? The question arises in connection with the
Assembly's approval, without formal dissent, of the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (the Declaration on Friendly Relations).' The present comment
will be limited to (a) a brief observation about the role of law in maintaining the peace, (b) the content of the Declaration on the first of the
seven principles of international law proclaimed therein,2 and (c) the
legal status of the Declaration itself.
Is it a waste of time to talk about controlling the use of force through
law? Thousands of megatons in the hands of frail human beings impose
the highest urgency upon efforts to control the use of force in international relations. The fact that homo sapiens has achieved a quarter
century without the firing of a nuclear weapon in anger is encouraging,
but it has not removed the danger that the use of such weapons could
put in doubt the survival of man. This danger is a brooding preoccupation of decision makers in the principal capitals of the world community. President John F. Kennedy voiced this concern to the United
*Samuel H. Sibley Professor of International Law, University of Georgia.
'G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 65 A.J.I.L. 243
(1971).
'The seven principles are:
[1] The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
[2] The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such
a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,
[3] The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter,
[4] The duty of states to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter,
[5] The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
[6] The principle of sovereign equality of states,
[7] The principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the Charter.
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Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961:
Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when
this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child
lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of
threads, capable of being
cut at any moment by accident or miscalcula3
tion or by madness.
The problem is not limited to a nuclear exchange. The sobering fact
is that, since the end of World War II, armed conflicts have exacted
millions of casualties and hundreds of billions of monetary resources
desperately needed for other purposes. No continent has been immune
and no nation has escaped the direct or indirect effect of this massive
diversion of resources to war. Although some conflicts are readily localized (Honduras-El Salvador), too many others have involved serious
risk of escalation to a direct engagement among nuclear powers.
The international community must therefore accept as a primary goal
the severe restriction or elimination of the use of force in the settlement
of international disputes. What might once have been a highly desirable
objective becomes in the present era a matter of compelling necessity.
The community of nations has need of all available means of limiting
force and strengthening the processes of peaceful settlement. Among
these, the norms and processes of international law are primary. Public
understanding of international law has suffered from the twin illusions
of cynicism and utopianism. The author, however, concluded almost
twenty years' service as a decision maker at various levels of government with a profound respect for the pervasive reality of international
law. The simple truth is that the overwhelming majority of international
boundaries are peaceful, the overwhelming majority of treaties are observed, the overwhelming majority of disputes are settled by peaceful
means. That this is not a prevailing public impression may be largely
due both to the occasional dramatic and tragic exceptions and to the
fact that news media pay less attention to normality, agreement and
serenity than to controversy and violence.
This is not the place to examine at length the role of international law
in maintaining the peace. Dean Acheson has said, in commenting on the
Cuban Missile Crisis, "[t]he power, position and prestige of the United
States had been challenged by another state; and law simply does not
deal with such questions of ultimate power. . . .The survival of states
is not a matter of law." 4 I would place alongside his statement the view
11961 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, JOHN F. KENNEDY 620 (1962).
'Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57th Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, 1963 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 13, 14.
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that the survival of states in a nuclear age may, indeed, depend upon
more effective norms and processes of law. Law provides a means for
resolving questions which might otherwise become matters of international conflict. Some treaties remove major issues from national rivalry,
for example: the Antarctic Treaty,5 the Treaty on Outer Space,, and the
rapidly evolving law about the deep oceans and sea beds. "What does
international law say about it?" is an important question on the check
list of policy officers of many governments, including that of the United
States, when policy decisions are being considered. The expectations of
international law have a considerable bearing upon the anticipated acceptance or rejection of a given action by the world community and this,
in turn, plays an important role in policy decisions. In many societies,
the lawfulness of an action affects the support which a government may
obtain or fail to obtain from its own people. In general, one may observe
that the American people expect their government to act in accordance
with law, both national and international.' Finally, international law
helps to identify and to record the common interests of nations and
organizes cooperation to achieve common goals. At the top of the list
of such common interests is the avoidance of a nuclear holocaust, cutting across ideological, cultural, economic and psychological differences.

8

The first principle of the Declaration on Friendly Relations declares
"that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations." This wording is an almost exact quotation of
article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. The exception is found in
the substitution of the word "States" for "All Members" as used at the
beginning of article 2(4). This change was made deliberately in order
to extend the obligation to all states and not only to members of the
United Nations. 9 The idea is reinforced by article 2(6) of the Charter
'The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
6Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
'This is evidenced by the fact that public debate about particular policies of the United States
frequently includes a lively discussion of legal issues; a persuasive legal argument carries great
weight with public opinion. See, e.g., I THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk
ed. 1968); 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk ed. 1969).
'For an interesting and realistic discussion of the role of law in decision making, see L. HENKIN,
How NATIONs BEHAVE (1968).
'Report of the 1966 Special Comm. on Principles of Int'l L. concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States, 21 U.N. GAOR 37, U.N. Doc. A/6230 (1966).
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which provides that the Organization shall ensure that States which are
not Members act in accordance with the principles of the Charter "so
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security."
This first principle is elaborated in thirteen paragraphs, numbered
below for convenience.10 The first paragraph repeats the norm of article
loll] Every state has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a
violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed
as a means of settling international issues.
[2] A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility
under international law.
[3] In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, states have the duty
to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression.
14] Every state has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing
international boundaries of another state or as a means of solving international disputes, including
territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of states.
[5] Every state likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate
international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound to respect. Nothing in the
foregoing shall be construed as prejudicing the positions of the parties concerned with regard to
the status and effects of such lines under their special regimes or as affecting their temporary
character.
[6] States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.
[7] Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred
to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to selfdetermination and freedom and independence.
[8] Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of
irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another
state.
[9] Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating
in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
[10] The territory of a state shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the
use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a state shall not be
the. object of acquisition by another state resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial
acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal. Nothing in the
foregoing shall be construed as affecting:
(a) Provisions of the Charter or any international agreement prior to the Charter
regime and valid under international law; or
(b) The powers of the Security Council under the Charter.
[II] All states shall pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal
treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and strive to
adopt appropriate measures to reduce international tensions and strengthen confidence among
states.
[12] All states shall comply in good faith with their obligations under the generally recognized
principles and rules of international law with respect to the maintenance of international peace
and security, and shall endeavor to make the United Nations security system based upon the
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2(4) of the Charter and adds that such a threat or use of force "constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United
Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international
issues." Such language is reminiscent of the renunciation of war "as an
instrument of national policy" of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but is
probably narrower because of the more restrictive language of article
2(4). The word "never" lends some weight to the idea that article 2(4)
isjus cogens, particularly if it is taken seriously by the Security Council
and the General Assembly as a peremptory norm.
Paragraph (2) states that "a war of aggression constitutes a crime
against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international
law." The effect of this language is to proclaim that article 6(a)" of the
Niirnberg Charter is a part of the law of the Charter of the United
Nations. The Nflrnberg principles had been unanimously affirmed by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1946,12 and a year later the Assembly
directed the International Law Commission to formulate the principles
of international law recognized in the N~irnberg Charter and in the
judgment of the Tribunal. 3 This task was merged into the work of the
International Law Commission on a draft code of offenses against the
peace and security of mankind and this, in turn, has been postponed
awaiting the results of the Special Committee on the Definition of
Aggression, a task which is still in process. The one-sentence paragraph
in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, with no defi ition of "aggression" or of "responsibility," breaks no new ground in international law.
There is little doubt that the governments of the world have put their
collective blessing upon the action taken against war criminals at the
end of World War II. The framing of these principles in general terms
for future application is a more formidable and more uncertain task;
their application at the end of World War II depended upon factual
circumstances which may or may not be repeated.
Another short paragraph declares that "States have the duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression." A number of delegations, including the U.S.,"4 pointed out that this prohibition can apply
Charter more effective.
[13] Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any
way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.
"Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. 472, 474, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
2
G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/236 at 1144 (1946).
3
G.A. Res. 177, U.N. Doc. A/505 at 1280 (1947).
"See Statement by Richard H. Gimer, U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N. General
Assembly, U.S./U.N. Press Release 122, Sept. 24, 1970, at 5, reprinted in 63 DEP'T STATE BULL.
623, 625 (1970).
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only to governments since nations with strong guarantees of free speech
and free press would face formidable constitutional issues if an attempt
were made to enforce the obligation against individuals. Further, "propaganda for wars of aggression" has little legal meaning in the absence
of a definition of aggression. In any event, the present author is dubious
about the desirability or the efficacy of attempts to restrain international debate through law. The language of international intercourse
will become more restrained as real issues are resolved; one can hope
that such language will be carefully chosen, especially in the presence
of dangerous disputes, but the regulation of debate through law appears
to have little future.
Paragraph (4) proclaims the duty of every state "to refrain from the
threat or use of force to violate the existing international boundaries of
another State or as a means of solving international disputes, including
territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of States." Territorial and boundary disputes continue to be a source of high controversy
and armed conflict. Most of them, however, have their origins in other
decades or other centuries, and few disclose a need for immediate solution as an emergency matter. It is appropriate, therefore, for the world
community to say to the parties to such disputes that the overriding
requirement for maintaining the peace imposes a duty to keep such
problems within the confines of peaceful settlement and that the use of
force in such situations is prohibited. It may be argued by some that
this would give an unconscionable advantage to the status quo and
would deprive claimants of elementary justice. The same objection can
be made against other principles of law, both municipal and international. It may be that the world community, in prohibiting the use of
force to settle boundary disputes, should offer a reasonable alternative
method of settlement. Parties to such disputes are unlikely to be satisfied by the politically dominated debates of the Security Council and
the General Assembly. The International Court of Justice can dispose
of certain minor problems, but territorial and boundary issues of major
importance have a high political content which the parties are unlikely
to submit to that Tribunal. For possible consideration is the establishment of a United Nations commission on international boundaries,
composed of men and women who have earned general international
esteem for integrity, wisdom, impartiality and diplomatic skill. Such a
commission could maintain a register of agreed boundaries and could
be available to the parties for advice, inquiry, conciliation, mediation
or other forms of peaceful settlement. Having examined the merits of a
particular dispute, the commission might advise a party to accept a
compromise adjustment or to drop a frivolous or insubstantial claim.
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In any event, the Declaration on Friendly Relations appears to have
moved constructively in throwing the weight of the United Nations
against the threat or use of force in such situations.
Paragraph (5) of the Declaration merits special attention. It proclaims the duty "to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate
international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established
by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or
which it is otherwise bound to respect." This is without prejudice to "the
positions of the parties concerned with regard to the status and effects
of such lines under their special regimes or as affecting their temporary
character." If this language means anything, it has a direct bearing upon
the situation of the divided states such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam.
The violations of demarcation and armistice lines have resulted in two
major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and major crises have developed
from time to time over Berlin and Germany. It can be assumed that if
the Federal Republic of Germany moved several divisions into East
Germany to achieve reunification by force, the Soviet Union and its
allies would not look upon such action as a family affair among Germans. The Soviet Union charged, however, that the United Nations and
United States forces intervened in a civil war in Korea, and the same
charge has been made by various and sundry about Vietnam. The Declaration on Friendly Relations appears to say that, whatever the issues
between the parties in the divided states, in Kashmir, the Middle East
or other places where demarcation and armistice lines are not settled
international boundaries, those issues are not to be settled by the threat
or use of force. Against the background of the history of the post-World
War II period, this is a conclusion of the highest importance. Here
again, a principle deriving from the necessity for maintaining the peace
may favor the status quo and may tend toward making permanent
certain arrangements which were considered to be temporary at their
inception. But the price, if it is to be considered a price, is to be paid
for an overriding objective.
In a short paragraph (6) the Declaration proclaims the duty "to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." This formulation emerged from proposals made by Czechoslovakia, a joint proposal
by Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States,
another by Chile, and a joint proposal by Italy and the Netherlands. 5
"The proposals are found in 21 U.N. GAOR, 1966 Special Comm. on Principles of Int'l L.
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 37, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/D.C.2
(1966).
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It draws support from a Resolution of the Security Council of April 9,
1964 (S.5650), which condemned reprisals as incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations. Although there is very
little in the discussions which led to the adoption of the Declaration to
throw light on the meaning of "reprisal" as used here, it is clear that it
was not intended to apply only in the narrow sense in which it has been
used in traditional international law with respect to, for example, the
relations between belligerents and neutrals in a war situation. As used
here, it includes retaliation, in its broadest sense, against injuries which
do not support or require the exercise of a right of self-defense. It seems
to declare the policy of the world community that force shall not be used
where the injury is of a lower order of criticality, even though violence
might be involved, and where peaceful processes ought to have a chance
to provide a remedy. Thus, affronts to honor, dignity and prestige,
emotions of anger, outrage and revenge are not a basis for a lawful use
of force. It would obviously strengthen what would appear to be a
constructive development in the law if the Security Council and the
General Assembly were to take seriously the lower orders of injury and
stand ready to condemn them and to insist upon appropriate amends.'
Paragraph (7) provides a dramatic example of the influence of the
large number of new nations who did not have a chance to participate
in the development of traditional international law or, indeed, in the
drafting of the United Nations Charter. That paragraph declares that
"every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples . . . of their right to self-determination and freedom
and independence." In the elaboration of the fifth principle" of the
Declaration, an effort is made to identify such peoples; there is also
added the thought that "such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the [U.N.]
Charter." Some 76 nations have entered the United Nations since 1945,
and most of them have emerged from colonial status. They are insisting
strenuously that the process of decolonization be completed. In the
simplest terms, the Declaration seems to say that colonial powers are
not entitled to use force to maintain their control over colonial peoples
"Instructive is the handling of the Eichmann case, brought before the U.N. Security Council
by Argentina. The Security Council requested Israel "to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law." 15 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. Apr.-June 1960, at 35, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). The matter was closed by a joint communiqfie (3 August 1960) by Israel and Argentina in which Israel acknowledged that the actions of
Israeli citizens in seizing Eichmann in Argentina had infringed the latter's fundamental rights.
"Reprinted in note 2 supra.
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and that the latter are entitled to resist such force and to obtain outside
aid in the process. Predictably, this portion of the Declaration evoked
widely divergent views, to be found in the discussions in the Assembly's
Sixth Committee. 8 A number of the new states expressed the regret that
the Declaration did not fully embrace the resolution of the General
Assembly of 1960, called the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 9 Portugal said of the entire
Declaration on Friendly Relations that "General Assembly resolutions
were only recommendations and could not therefore constitute a source
of law." The United States Representative supported the United Kingdom view that states are not entitled "under the Charter, to intervene
by giving military support or armed assistance in Non-Self-Governing
Territories or elsewhere" and that such support was limited by the
purposes and principles of the Charter and "was therefore controlled by
the over-riding duty to maintain international peace and security." The
U.S. Representative added that "the Declaration does not constitute a
license for gun-running" and that it does not limit "the right or responsibility of an administering authority to employ appropriate-measures of
police protection in order to maintain law and order in the territories
for which it is responsible." I shall turn in a moment to the legal status
of the Declaration as a whole, but it appears that wide divergencies
disclosed in the travaux prparatoiresleave in some confusion the legal
aspects of the use of force in colonial situations. A simple political fact
of life is, however, that an overwhelming majority of the members of
the United Nations are determined to press for decolonization and that
the maintenance of colonial relationships will have no significant support in the Security Council or the General Assembly.
In two further paragraphs, the Declaration proclaims a duty to refrain from "organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular
forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the
territory of another State" and from "organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State
. ... " When the United Nations Charter was drafted the central concern was the type of massive and highly organized aggression by conventional forces launched by Japan, Italy and Germany. Since 1945, the use
of armed agents, guerillas, "volunteers" and mercenaries has become
the more usual form of aggressive action against a neighbor. Such forms
of attack are no less deadly in purpose, no less a threat to the territory
"125 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. 1180-84th meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. (1970).
"G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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or independence of the victim, and no less a threat to the maintenance
of the general peace. The term "indirect aggression" is more properly
reserved for aggression by proxy and should not be used, in the interest
of clarity, for these informal modes of attack. If the world community
makes it clear that these unacknowledged forms of attack are contrary
to international law and to the U.N. Charter, an important step forward
will have been taken.
Paragraph (10) states that "[tihe territory of a State shall not be the
object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter." It continues, without further
reference to the Charter: "The territory of a State shall not be the object
of acquisition by another State resulting from the use of force. No
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be
recognized as legal." The comments by the delegates clearly reflected
the present preoccupation of a number of them with the situation in the
Middle East. The Representative of Iraq, for example, called the Declaration "true rules of jus cogens." Israel, on the other hand, gave the
Declaration a rather chilly reception. One recalls that the Security
Council's important resolution of November 22, 1967, on the Middle
East,20 contained a preambular clause reading, "Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war .... "
On broader grounds, there is merit in making it clear that the right
of conquest must give way to the overriding requirement to maintain
the peace and that force cannot be used to acquire territory even where
the use of force occurs under a claim of individual or collective selfdefense. Looking ahead, one can anticipate that burgeoning populations
may cause the revival of a claim for "lebensraum." It is not too early
to nail down the law and the policy of the world community that,
whatever the solutions may be, war is not among them.
The Declaration then contains two hortatory paragraphs which need
not detain us here. One refers to "general and complete disarmament,"
and the other includes a call for an "endeavor to make the United
Nations security system based upon the Charter more effective." Both
are large and important issues which would lead far beyond the scope
of this comment.
A final paragraph concerning the first principle provides that
"[niothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging
or diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter
concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful." This is, to say the
20

S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, 1382d meeting 8 (1967).
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least, a rather curious statement; to a veteran in such matters it appears
to reflect the caution of a committee of 31 nations who did not have
the time, the inclination or the consensus to spell out in which respects
the Declaration might affect "the scope of the provisions of the
Charter" about the lawful use of force. It might have given comfort to
some who were nervous about "amending" the Charter through a declaration of the General Assembly. It might have reflected the view that
the "foregoing paragraphs" simply stated the existing law of the
Charter. But if these paragraphs mean anything at all, it appears obvious that they have implications for disputes before the Security Council and the General Assembly involving the lawfulness of the use of
force. The Declaration clearly attempts to limit the use of force by a
state exercising sovereignty over a colonial territory. There are implications for regional organizations under chapter VIII of the Charter.
More importantly, the Declaration has an impact upon "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense" referred to in article 51 of
the Charter. Proposals made in the Special Committee about paragraph
(1 3) leave the impression that the concern of the delegates was that the
Declaration not narrow or inhibit the right of self-defense. But in elaborating the duties of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in
certain circumstances, it may well be that the Declaration confirmed the
right of self-defense at points at which some writers have questioned it.
Surely a movement across demarcation lines is something more than a
civil war situation. Similarly, the Declaration would seem to clarify the
point that the right of self-defense in article 5 1 is not limited to formal
invasion by large-scale conventional forces, but also applies to prohibited guerilla incursions."'
Perhaps all that need be said at the moment is that the Declaration
on Friendly Relations leaves some unfinished business. The definition
2
The author's reflection on the right of self-defense must await another occasion. In general,
governments are likely to resist attempts to constrict the right of self-defense even though there
may be difficulties in (a) proving the facts, (b) competing assertions as to which party is at fault,
(c) inadequate procedures for impartial findings by international bodies such as the Security
Council and the General Assembly, (d) the escalatory possibilities of "collective" self-defense and
other such issues. The maintenance of peace may require the international community to confirm
and strengthen the right of self-defense, as a deterrence to those who might be tempted to initiate
a prohibited use of force, and to mobilize international opinion and action more effectively in
support of the victim. In the author's view, a serious effort should be made to restrict severely
actions taken in the name of "anticipatory" self-defense on the broad ground that it should never
be assumed that it is too late to seek a peaceful settlement. A useful discussion and bibliography
on the problem of self-defense can be found in M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961). See also THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 7.
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of aggression is one item. Someday the United Nations might take up
the question of the elaboration of the right of self-defense, but the
reluctance of governments to circumscribe such rights in any way might
leave this topic for continuing dispute among the writers.
These all-too-brief comments can do little more than give an impression of the contents of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, insofar
as the use of force is concerned. Many volumes will undoubtedly be
written as officials and scholars examine them further; debate on such
issues in the United Nations will not be silenced. A question remains
as to whether the Declaration is, or was intended to be, a statement of
international law. Its full title begins with the words, "Declaration on
Principles of International Law." Its final paragraph declares that
"[t &]he principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration
constitute basic principles of international law, and consequently appeals to all States to be guided by these principles in their international
conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of the strict
observance of these principles." This language is somewhat ambiguous,
perhaps by design. If the purpose was clearly to assert the Declaration
as law, the paragraph might have begun, "This Declaration embodying
the principles of the Charter constitutes basic principles of international
law," etc.
Let us note certain aspects of the Declaration which have a bearing
upon its legal character:
1. The Declaration was the result of a deliberateprocess extending
over several years. We do not have here a resolution of the General
Assembly developed suddenly in the heat of a particular controversy
voted by delegations without an opportunity for full consideration by
governments. The work was launched by a General Assembly resolution
in 1962; it was reviewed in eight annual sessions of the Assembly, chiefly
by its Sixth (Legal) Committee. The Assembly constituted a Special
Committee in 1964, expanded to 31 members in 1966, which worked on
the Declaration in six meetings in Mexico City, Geneva and at the
headquarters of the United Nations in New York.
2. The Declaration was adopted without a formal vote but without
dissent at its 25th Anniversary meeting. The Special Committee developed the Declaration on the basis of a consensus of its 31 members and
rejected proposals that it proceed on the basis of divided votes. The final
draft of the Declaration was adopted without objection by the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly after hearing the statements of any
delegation who wished to speak over a period of several days."2 The
2See note 18 supra.
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plenary session of the Assembly adopted the Declaration without dissent
at its formal 25th Anniversary session. One must not read too much into
this formal unanimity. The statements of governments in the Special
Committee and in the Sixth Committee reflect the understandings of
governments about the meaning of the Declaration and must be consulted as travaux priparatoires.Formal reservations in the final session
were not made, presumably, in reliance upon statements made at earlier
stages. Some might have remained silent because of their view that
General Assembly resolutions are recommendations and cannot make
law. The fact is, however, that no delegate asked to have a negative vote
recorded in the Sixth Committee or in the plenary session.
3. The Declaration was formulated by representatives of diverse
legal, ideological, cultural and political systems. All groups of states
were represented on the Special Committee-NATO and Warsaw Pact
members, nonaligned Latin Americans, Asians and Africans, developed
and underdeveloped, large and small." The Committee clearly represented "the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems
of the world" referred to in article 9 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. Protracted negotiations occurred among divergent
points of view, but no group can be accused of trying to run rough shod
over another.
4. The Declaration, in the main, reflects existing international law.
To the extent that the Declaration merely embraces well established
norms of international law, there is no need to be troubled about the
legal character of a General Assembly resolution. In some points the
Declaration appears to clarify points of law on which there has been
sharp debate. For example, the United States has taken the view that
Communist states act illegally if they throw guerilla forces against a
neighbor as what they call a "war of liberation" in support of their
world revolution. Moreover, the Declaration also comes close to a new
international legal norm in what it says about the use of force in colonial
situations. In any event, the assertion that the principles elaborated in
the Declaration are a part of the law of the Charter has some significance if the Charter is to be treated as a "paramount" source of law.
5. The Declaration did not emerge as a carefully drawn legal
instrument. As the Representative of Finland put it in his remarks to
"The membership of the enlarged Special Committee consisted of Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Ghana, Guatemala,
India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Syria, U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
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the Sixth Committee:
The draft Declaration, like all works of man, was open to criticism.
The product of a number of compromises, it was somewhat long and
the wording left much to be desired. As pointed out in the report, there
were many gaps and imperfections, some matters were dealt with
solely in the preamble, and the text contained
some overlapping, incon24
sistencies, omissions and redundancies.
Others expressed similar views. Critical terms such as "aggression"
remained undefined. The Declaration was not reinforced by strong procedural provisions about giving practical effect to its principles, not even
in the organs of the United Nations itself. It may be said, however, that
inartistic, obscure or even contradictory drafting is not unknown to the
law, whether municipal or international, and such deficiences need not
be taken as decisive.
6. The United Nations GeneralAssembly was not given broad legislative responsibility. It seems clear that those who drafted the Charter
did not wish to establish a General Assembly with broad legislative
powers. It is equally clear that the Assembly has certain powers which
are legislative in character, for example, the financial powers under
article 17 and the authority to establish and instruct subsidiary organs
under article 22. It is unlikely that the larger members will yield extensive legislative authority to an Assembly in which 10% of the world's
population and 5% of the contributions to the U.N. can now cast twothirds of the votes. Even so, it can be said that some resolutions of the
Assembly carry legal weight and that this may be particularly true of
those that purport to be an authoritative interpretation of the U.N.
Charter itself.2" It is the author's view that the legal status of General
Assembly resolutions is in flux and that we may well see a growth in
the authority of the Assembly by custom, precedent, acquiescence and
other means less formal than Charter amendment. After all, the Assembly is the nations of the world in congress assembled and it would be
imprudent to discount their solemn conclusions as a "source" of law,
particularly where a high degree of unanimity is present.
7. The Declaration was not submitted to governments for ratification as a treaty or convention. In carrying out the provision of article
13 that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommen2125 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. 1179th meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. (1970).
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dations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification, the Assembly has arranged for the
development of multilateral treaties recommended to governments for
their ratification. In this work it has had valuable assistance from the
International Law Commission, the Geneva Disarmament Committee
and such bodies as its own Committees on Outer Space and the
Seabeds. No such treaty was used for the Declaration on Friendly Relations. This is, of course, a matter of some moment for the United States.
In our system international law is, under certain circumstances, a part
of the law of the land. Can we permit such law to develop without the
participation of our Congress, either through the treaty power of the
Senate or by the joint action of both Houses? In the Sixth Committee,
the United States Representative was not completely clear on this
point.26 He said:
We thus took as our task an "elaboration" of fundamental charter
principles; that is, the process of spelling out in important detail the
implications of these charter principles, taking into account the experience of the members of the United Nations since this most basic of
post-war treaties entered into force in 1945. The declaration does not,
under the guise of charter analysis, circumvent the amendment provisions contained in article 108 or the ratification requirements of our
own Constitution. Nor does it in effect constitute a revision of the
charter by the expedient of a resolution to be adopted by the General
Assembly.
When one "elaborates" or spells out the "implications" or proclaims
principles which were not reasonably spelled out in the Charter, is one
not making law?
Although Senators Javits (R., N.Y.) and Pell (D., R.I.) were members of the U.S. Delegation to the 25th U.N. General Assembly, the
author understands that there was no consultation with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Committee
before the General Assembly took final action on the Declaration on
Friendly Relations. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 provides in section 327 that U.S. representatives to the United Nations
"shall, at all times, act in accordance with . . . instructions [and] cast
any and all votes under the Charter of the United Nations." Many of
these votes can help create legally binding obligations upon the United
States in the Security Council, the General Assembly and the special2

See Statement by Richard H. Gimer, supra note 14 at 624.
122 U.S.C. § 287a (1970).
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ized agencies. The advice and consent of the Senate or of the Congress
as a whole is not required with respect to these votes although subsequent action by the Congress may be required, as in the case of assessed
dues. It might have been prudent, however, to consult those Committees
after the completion of the final draft of theYbeclaration by the Special
Committee and before the discussions in the Sixth Committee in order
that the statement by the U.S. Representative in the Sixth Committee
could have taken into account the general reactions of the key committees of the Congress. Having said that, an examination of the statement
of the U.S. Representative in the Sixth Committee suggests that he
probably did, in fact, express the qualifications which might have arisen
in discussion with Congressional Committees. Although new international law can come into being without dependence upon the internal
constitutional arrangements of each and every nation, the participation
of the United States in that process should, on matters of great importance, involve both the Executive and Legislative branches in some appropriate form even though formal treaties are not involved.
What did the delegates to the United Nations say about the legal
character of the Declaration? Some 37 of them commented on this point
in their statements in the Sixth Committee18 and in plenary session of
the Assembly on October 6, 1970.9 Eight of these seemed clearly to
affirm their understanding that the Declaration was indeed a statement
of international law.3 0 Two (Portugal and Israel) treated the Declaration as having the status of a recommendation rather than an enactment
of law. The great majority (28) used such expressions as "A code of
good conduct," "An important contribution," "An important step," "A
decisive point," "An important landmark" and a variety of similar
judgments. This center group included such important members as the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., Japan, Italy,
as well as the Legal Counsel of the U.N. Secretariat.
What follows is a personal assessment. The law of the United Nations
Charter is not now quite the same as it was before the Declaration on
Friendly Relations was adopted. Although not a formal enactment, it
aSee note 18 supra.
2125 U.N. GAOR

U.N. Doc. A/PV.1860 (1970).
"'For example, Ecuador: ". . . contains binding obligations on States concerning their legal and
political positions vis-a-vis the principles of the interpretation of international law incorporated in
the Charter." Iraq: ". . . they constituted fundamental principles of international law which States
were bound to respect and which therefore could be considered as true rules of jus cogens."
Ethiopia: ". . . the principles outlined in the draft Declaration would be binding on States and
. . . their adoption by the General Assembly would sanction their classification underjus cogens."
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gives more flesh and bone to key articles, such as article 2(4). The
Declaration seems at least to be an authoritative interpretation of the
Charter by the nations of the world in congress assembled. It can be
predicted that the Declaration will receive the respectful attention of the
International Court of Justice if cases arise before it to which the Declaration is relevant. It will be difficult for writers to insist that the law is
something other than that contained in the Declaration. Governments
who will make a judgment about the legal character of a proposed
course of action must take the Declaration into account in judging the
reaction of the world community to legal issues. The Declaration also
provides an agenda for the further codification of international law in
more precise terms.
Much will depend, of course, upon the attitudes and action of governments in dealing with specific issues and the influence which the Declaration will have in the consideration of problems brought before the
Security Council and the General Assembly. It will be little more than
an empty gesture if members do not take it seriously in their own
conduct and in the application of the Declaration in United Nations
debate. The role of the United Nations in maintaining the peace has
been weakened by the abuse of the veto in the Security Council and by
the indifference and lack of responsibility of many of its members and,
at times, of the Secretariat itself. The United Nations as an organization
can do no more to strengthen international law than its members are
willing for it to do. The law of the Charter and its elaboration in the
Declaration on Friendly Relations will develop strength and vitality
only through the determination of the governments of the world to insist
upon the norms of international law-especially those which are basic
to the maintenance of peace. This is what I referred to earlier as "a
matter of compelling necessity." Did the United Nations General Assembly make a significant contribution to international law regarding
the use of force? We shall have to wait and see. On balance, I think it

